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I. INTRODUCTION
The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions, except for significant
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure discussed below in
Section V.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court weighed in on a
variety of subject matter jurisdiction issues. To begin, the Texas Supreme
Court reaffirmed its prior decision1 and held in Farmers Texas County
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Beasley that a plaintiff’s allegation that his in-
surer paid the negotiated rate rather than the medical provider’s “list
rate” did not establish “actual or threatened harm” sufficient to support
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1. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 795–96 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(holding uninjured plaintiff lacked standing to sue personal-injury-protection insurer that
paid negotiated rather than billed rates for medical expenses where she “d[id] not claim
that she ha[d] any unreimbursed, out-of-pocket medical expenses” or that her “providers
withheld medical treatment as a result of [insurer] reducing their bills”).
21
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standing to sue.2 The plaintiff there sued his personal-injury-protection
insurer after it paid him $1,068.90 to resolve his claim for $2,662.54 in
billed medical charges previously paid at the negotiated rate by his health
insurer.3 After the personal-injury-protection insurer refused to pay the
difference between the negotiated and billed rates up to the policy maxi-
mum, the plaintiff sued, claiming the insurer “arbitrarily reduced [his]
benefits because of health benefits paid under [his] independently ob-
tained health insurance.”4 The trial court granted the insurer’s plea to the
jurisdiction, but the Twelfth Tyler Court of Appeals reversed, holding the
allegation that “he was personally aggrieved” by the inadequate benefit
payment was enough to confer standing on the plaintiff.5 The supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeals, reasoning that its prior holding
in Forth was controlling.6 According to the supreme court, the “only
meaningful difference between the facts” in the two cases was the type of
relief sought,7 but the standing question remained the same: “Did the
litigant plead an injury sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction?”8
Answering “no” as it had in Forth, the supreme court emphasized that
the plaintiff had not incurred any out-of-pocket costs, been denied treat-
ment, or otherwise demonstrated any injury.9 The supreme court there-
fore dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.10
In a case “arising out of the breakup of a limited partnership,” the
Texas Supreme Court made clear that challenges to a partner’s ability to
recover damages for impairment of its partnership interest or to assert a
claim belonging to a partnership are questions of capacity to sue, rather
than standing, and thus do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.11
When a limited partner’s ability to recover damages individually for an
injury allegedly suffered by the partnership was challenged on appeal, the
supreme court questioned whether the statutes and other substantive law
governing business organizations and “which claims and remedies may be
pursued by the organization and which by its stakeholders individually”
2. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 238 (Tex. 2020).
3. Id. at 239.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 240.
6. Id. at 243.
7. Id. at 242. The Forth plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief to require
her insurer “to use ‘an independent and fair evaluation to determine what amount of [her]
medical expenses were reasonable’” while the Beasley plaintiff sought “monetary dam-
ages” representing the difference between the negotiated and list rates up to the insurance
maximum. Id. Regardless, the supreme court concluded that both plaintiffs’ “ultimate aim”
was the same: “they both claimed that a PIP insurer who paid negotiated rates to satisfy all
of the plaintiff’s financial obligations to medical providers did not pay reasonable expenses
that the plaintiffs incurred.” Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The supreme court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the collateral source rule
should apply to determine the amount of personal-injury-protection reimbursement, not-
ing it had previously held that health insurers’ negotiated discounts “do not constitute a
collateral source of benefits to the insured in this context.” Id. (citing Haygood v. De Es-
cabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. 2011)).
10. Id. at 243.
11. Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt. LLC, 610 S.W.3d. 763, 769 (Tex. 2020).
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were matters “of constitutional standing that affects a court’s subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.”12 Following its “approach to jurisdictional questions de-
signed to strengthen finality and reduce the possibility of delayed attacks
on judgments,” the supreme court held that partners or other stakehold-
ers in business organizations have “constitutional standing to sue for an
alleged loss in the value of [their] interest in the organization.”13 Further,
the supreme court explained that substantive law governing “a stake-
holder’s ability to recover certain measures of damages” or to assert a
claim that belongs to the organization are capacity or merits-based ques-
tions that do not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate the
disputes.14
In Morath v. Lewis, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that a plain-
tiff’s nonsuit under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 moots the case and
“extinguishes” subject matter jurisdiction regardless of where or when
the notice of nonsuit is filed.15 There, the plaintiffs (parents of school
students) abandoned their claims against the Texas Education Agency’s
commissioner regarding administration of the State of Texas Assessments
of Academic Readiness (STAAR) exam by filing their “Notice of Non-
suit Without Prejudice” in the supreme court after it had asked for and
received opening briefing on the commissioner’s petition for review of
the lower courts’ denial of his jurisdictional plea.16 The commissioner op-
posed the nonsuit, claimed it was procedurally ineffective, and asked the
supreme court to nonetheless address the plaintiffs’ complaints because
the case “involve[d] ‘a matter of public concern.’”17 The supreme court
declined the commissioner’s invitation, holding that: (1) a plaintiff has an
“absolute right” to take a nonsuit; (2) Rule 162 “remains the appropriate
procedural mechanism” to effectuate nonsuits even on appeal; and (3) a
nonsuit, “[h]owever it is achieved procedurally,” moots the case and de-
prives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.18 The supreme court fur-
ther held there is no recognized “matter-of-public-concern exception to
mootness,” and it therefore lacked the power to do anything but dismiss
for want of jurisdiction.19
In San Antonio River Authority v. Austin Bridge & Road, LP, the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the interplay between the goods-and-services
contracts waiver of immunity under Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Gov-
ernment Code20 and the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate within
12. Id. at 776.
13. Id. at 778.
14. Id.
15. Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 787.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 788.
19. Id. at 789.
20. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 271.151–271.152 (waiving a local governmen-
tal entity’s immunity from breach of contract actions based on “written contract[s] stating
the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local govern-
mental entity that is properly executed” by that entity).
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such goods-and-services contracts.21 In this case, the local governmental
entity and its general contractor for a dam repair project disagreed about
the “scope of work and payment” provisions of their contract.22 The con-
tractor invoked the contract’s arbitration provisions, and the local entity
participated until the arbitrator denied its governmental immunity plea.23
Afterwards, the local entity objected to the arbitration, asserted it lacked
authority to agree to arbitrate, and sued the contractor.24 Following
mixed results in the lower courts,25 the supreme court granted review to
address: “(1) whether [the] agreement to arbitrate is enforceable[;] (2) if
so, whether the courts must decide matters of governmental immunity,
notwithstanding the agreement of the parties[;] and (3) whether immu-
nity bars this breach-of-contract claim against the” local entity.26
Addressing each question in turn, the supreme court first concluded
that Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code “unmistakably
authorized” a local governmental entity to agree to arbitrate disputes
arising out of goods-and-services contracts for which immunity was
waived.27 Next, the supreme court held that courts, rather than arbitra-
tors, had the “non-delegable role” to “determine whether governmental
immunity exists, whether such immunity has been waived, and to what
extent.”28 Finally, the supreme court addressed whether the contractor
provided “services”29 to the local entity and sought recoverable damages,
thereby bringing the repair contract within the scope of Chapter 271’s
immunity waiver.30 The supreme court noted that the contractor had un-
dertaken to fulfill some of the local entity’s “management obligations”
for the repair project, including providing it with insurance certificates,
“itemized ‘cost breakdown together with supporting data,’” and “payroll
transcripts and payment applications.”31 Those “services,” while not the
“primary purpose” of the repair contract, were enough for the supreme
court to conclude it was a goods-and-services contract subject to Chapter
271.32 The supreme court rejected the local entity’s argument that the





25. See id. at 620.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 622–25 (citing and analyzing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 271.151–271.154).
28. Id. at 626–28 (reasoning that “[b]ecause immunity bears on the trial court’s juris-
diction to stay or compel arbitration, and to enforce an arbitration award in a judgment
against a local government, . . . [a]n agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable against a local
government to the extent it purports to submit immunity questions to an arbitrator.”).
29. Id. at 628–29 (noting that “services” under Section 271.151(2)(A) of the Texas Lo-
cal Government Code is “broad enough to encompass a wide array of activities . . . per-
formed for the benefit of another” but that “[C]hapter 271 does not apply to a contract
that provides only an indirect, attenuated benefit to the local government.”) (internal quo-
tations and citations omitted).
30. Id. at 630–31.
31. Id. at 629–30.
32. Id. at 630.
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contractor impermissibly sought consequential damages,33 reasoning that
the contractor’s claims could reasonably be characterized as “direct dam-
ages for amounts it alleges are ‘due and owed by the local governmental
entity under the contract,’” and thus held the local entity’s immunity was
waived for the contractor’s claims under Chapter 271.34
The Texas Supreme Court addressed extensions of immunity to private
actors in two cases this Survey period. In Nettles v. GTECH Corp., the
Texas Supreme Court applied, but did not explicitly adopt, a “derivative
sovereign immunity” doctrine allowing a private contractor to claim im-
munity to the extent its complained-of conduct was controlled by a gov-
ernmental entity.35 The plaintiffs there sued a contractor for the Texas
Lottery Commission for fraud, as well as for conspiring with and aiding
and abetting the commission’s fraud, relating to an allegedly misleading
scratch-off game.36 Applying a “control-based standard,”37 the supreme
court concluded that the contractor did not qualify for “derivative immu-
nity” with respect to the fraud claim but was immune from the conspiracy
and aiding and abetting claims.38 As to the fraud claim, the supreme court
emphasized that the contractor was “contractually obligated to design the
tickets,” including the “game specifications and instructions,” and the
commission did not instruct the contractor regarding the allegedly mis-
leading wording of those instructions.39 In contrast, the supreme court
found the conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims were “wholly deriva-
tive of an alleged underlying fraud by the Commission alone” in printing
and distributing the game tickets.40 According to the supreme court,
“[t]he record show[ed] that the Commission specified the manner in
which [the contractor] was to print and distribute the tickets . . . including
packaging, delivery vehicles, and delivery location,” and the contractor
was obligated to strictly conform to the commission’s specifications.41 Be-
cause the plaintiffs’ derivative claims against the contractor necessarily
33. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.153 (limiting recovery under Chapter 271
to specified elements of direct damages, “reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees,” and
“interest as allowed by law”).
34. San Antonio River Auth., 601 S.W.3d at 631.
35. Nettles v. GTECH Corp., 606 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tex. 2020); compare id. (noting the
parties did not brief, and the supreme court was not deciding, “whether we should recog-
nize a doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity for contractors, or if so, what standard we
should adopt for determining the scope of that immunity”), with id. at 740 (Boyd, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for its avoidance of these
questions and arguing the supreme court should “eliminate the uncertainty and decide”
them “[f]or the sake of other government contractors and those with claims against them—
not to mention the trial and appellate courts that must resolve those claims”).
36. Nettles, 606 S.W.3d at 729.
37. Id. at 732 n.3 (explaining that this “control-based standard is similar to the test for
distinguishing between independent contractors and employees[,]” which asks: “(1) did the
government tell the contractor what to do and how to do it (as opposed to the contractor
having ‘some discretion in performing the contract’); and if so, (2) did the contractor do as
it was told?”).
38. Id. at 739.
39. Id. at 736–37.
40. Id. at 738.
41. Id. at 739.
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implicated the commission’s “underlying decisions,” the supreme court
held the contractor was entitled to immunity.42
In the second case, University of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, the Texas
Supreme Court refused to extend sovereign immunity to a private univer-
sity employing a campus peace officer that fatally shot a student “follow-
ing a traffic stop.”43 When the student’s parents sued the university for
wrongful death, claiming it negligently hired, trained, supervised, and re-
tained the officer, the university asserted sovereign immunity for its law-
enforcement activities undertaken pursuant to authorization under the
Texas Education Code.44 As framed by the supreme court, the question
presented was “whether sovereign immunity extends to a private univer-
sity because the legislature has authorized it to enforce state and local law
through commissioned peace officers.”45 The supreme court concluded it
did not for two reasons.46 First, considering the governmental control-
based test, the supreme court found “[t]hat [state] control is absent” with
regard to the university’s police force.47 Specifically, the state “d[id] not
fund the University’s police department,” “set the department’s policies,
procedures, or protocols,” hire or fire its officers, or otherwise exercise
any responsibility for its “day-to-day operations and decision making.”48
Second, the supreme court found that extending immunity to the univer-
sity would not serve the “modern-day” purposes of the doctrine, namely
preserving separation of power and avoiding depletion of the public
treasury.49
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Spanton v. Bellah involved a restricted appeal following the entry of a
default judgment.50 The trial court granted a motion to authorize “substi-
tute service by first class and certified mail,” along with “attaching a copy
of the citation and petition to the gate” of a “specified house number on
‘Heathers Hill.’”51 The petition, citation, return of service, and motion for
default judgment, however, all identified the defendants’ address as on
“Heather Hills.”52 The Third Austin Court of Appeals held this minor
discrepancy did not invalidate service and upheld the default judgment.53
42. Id.
43. Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 602 S.W.3d 398, 401–02 (Tex. 2020).
44. Id. at 402. In particular, the supreme court noted that legislature authorized “pri-
vate universities to commission and employ peace officers,” which have “official immunity
. . . from which the University may derivatively benefit.” Id. at 401–02 (citing TEX. EDUC.
CODE § 51.212(b) among other authorities).
45. Id. at 404.
46. Id. at 406–11.
47. Id. at 408.
48. Id. at 407.
49. Id. at 409.
50. Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 315–16.
53. Id. at 315.
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The Texas Supreme Court disagreed.54 The supreme court noted that it
has long held that upholding a no-answer default judgment requires
“strict compliance” with the applicable requirements.55 Although a dis-
crepancy of this nature may be overlooked where a substituted service
order authorizes service upon the defendant wherever she may be found
and personal service is actually effectuated, “discrepancies in the defen-
dant’s name or address” are not otherwise trivial and preclude any “pre-
sumption of proper substitute service.”56 Accordingly, the supreme court
vacated the default judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.57
IV. VENUE
The Texas Supreme Court took on the “recurrent and perplexing pro-
cedural issue” of how to reconcile “conflicting mandatory venue provi-
sions” in In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc.58 The conflicting
provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code in question
were § 15.020, which allows parties to a “major transaction” to contractu-
ally agree to a venue for disputes,59 and § 65.023(a), which provides for
mandatory venue in the county where the defendant resides in injunction
cases.60 While the venue-selection clause in the parties’ contract specified
Harris County, the plaintiff sued in the county where the defendants were
domiciled.61 The trial court granted a motion to transfer to Harris
County, and the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals denied a petition
for writ of mandamus.62
The supreme court noted that § 15.020 specifically provides that a con-
tractual venue agreement falling within its scope must be enforced re-
gardless of any other provision of Title II of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.63 Because § 65.023(a) is not found in Title II, however,
§ 15.020 does not supersede the mandatory venue provision for injunc-
tion suits.64 The supreme court thus turned to an analysis of whether
venue was proper in the original county of suit based on the latter statute.
The supreme court explained that “[S]ection 65.023(a) is operative only
when a plaintiff’s pleadings in the underlying suit establish the relief
sought is ‘purely or primarily injunctive.’”65 After examining the sub-
stance of the plaintiff’s claims for relief, the supreme court concluded that
54. Id.
55. Id. at 316.
56. Id. at 317.
57. Id. at 318.
58. 596 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).
59. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.020.
60. In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 761; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 65.023(a).
61. In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 761–62.
62. Id. at 762.
63. Id. at 763–64.
64. Id. at 764. As the supreme court put it, § 15.020 is not a “super mandatory” venue
provision that controls beyond the express language of its provisions. Id.
65. Id. at 765 (quoting In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998)).
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injunctive relief was “not the dominant purpose or central focus” of the
case.66 Accordingly, the parties’ venue selection clause controlled, and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the case to Har-
ris County.67
V. DISCOVERY
On December 23, 2020, the Texas Supreme Court approved amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure 47, 99, 169, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, and 198.68 These amendments apply to cases filed on or after January
1, 2021, except for those cases filed in justice court.69
Rule 169 governs expedited actions, and the amendments to this rule
increased the amount-in-controversy limits for such actions from
$100,000.00 to $250,000.00, excluding interest, statutory or punitive dam-
ages and penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs.70 Correspondingly, Rule
190 was amended to provide that in Level 1 actions, which include expe-
dited actions and divorces involving $250,000.00 or less, the discovery pe-
riod begins when the first initial disclosures are due and continues for 180
days thereafter, and the total deposition time for each party is increased
from six hours to twenty hours.71 Likewise, in Level 2 actions, the discov-
ery period is now triggered by the first due date for initial disclosures, not
the filing of suit.72
Several amendments were made to the Rule 194 disclosure process to
bring it more in line with the automatic disclosure requirements in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). Now the parties must, in the absence
of an agreement or court order to the contrary, automatically disclose
certain information and documents without awaiting a request for disclo-
sures.73 For example, within thirty days after the filing of the first answer
or general appearance, a party must disclose the information required by
Rule 194.2(b),74 which includes all of the information required in the pre-
amendment version of this rule except for information regarding testify-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 768.
68. Tex. Sup. Ct. Misc. Docket No. 20-9153 (Dec. 23, 2020). Section 22.004(h-1) of the
Texas Government Code charged the supreme court with adopting “rules to promote the
prompt, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of civil actions filed in county courts at law
in which the amount in controversy does not exceed $250,000.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 22.004(h-1). The comment to the amendment of Rule 169, however, provides that such
rule is not limited to actions filed in county courts at law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 169 cmt. to 2021
amendment.
69. Tex. Sup. Misc. Docket No. 20-9153.
70. TEX. R. CIV. P. 169.
71. Id. at 190.2(b)(1)–(2).
72. Id. at 190.3(b)(1).
73. Id. at 194.1(a). These requirements do not apply to: (1) actions for review on an
administrative record; (2) forfeiture actions arising from a state statute; (3) a petition for
habeas corpus; (4) selected actions under the Family Code; (5) other actions involving do-
mestic violence; or (6) appeals from a justice court. Id. at 194.2(a), (d).
74. Id. at 194.2(b). Rule 194.2(c) details the information that must be disclosed in cer-
tain actions under the Family Code. Id. at 194.2(c).
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ing experts.75 Rule 194.2(b)(6) includes a new requirement requiring a
party to produce or describe by category and location “all documents,
electronically stored information, and tangible things” that the party
“may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely
for impeachment.”76
In turn, the amendments to Rule 193.3 permit privilege assertions re-
garding information that would otherwise be subject to required disclo-
sure,77 although objections or assertions of work product still are not
permitted.78 Moreover, Rule 192.2 prohibits, in the absence of an agree-
ment by the parties or a court order, the service of discovery on a party
until after such party’s initial disclosures are due.79
Akin to the requirements for pretrial disclosures set forth in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3), Rule 194.4 requires a party to disclose,
at least thirty days before trial, a list of the names and contact informa-
tion for the witnesses the party expects to present at trial, as well as those
it may call if the need arises, along with a list of each document or other
exhibit (including summaries) the party expects to offer and may offer if
the need arises.80
Rule 195 governs discovery regarding testifying experts, and it requires
the automatic disclosure of the information formerly listed in Rule
194.2(f), along with additional information regarding the expert’s qualifi-
cations (including a listing of all publications authored in the last ten
years, a listing of the cases in which the expert has testified in the last four
years, and a statement of the compensation to be paid to the expert).81
The disclosures regarding testifying experts are due ninety days before
the end of the discovery period for parties seeking affirmative relief and
sixty days before the end of the discovery period for all other experts.82
Rule 195 also includes new provisions, which were borrowed from Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) and (C), exempting from discov-
ery certain communications between a party’s attorney and its testifying
experts, draft expert reports, and draft expert disclosures.83
75. See id. at 194.2(a)–(b). The amendment to Rule 99(b) requires that citations “no-
tify the defendant that the defendant may be required to make initial disclosures.” Id. at
99(b).
76. Id. at 194.2(b)(6). If a party does not produce its documents and other materials
with its response, the response must include a reasonable time and method for the party’s
production of those items. Id. at 194.1(b).
77. Id. at 193.3(a).
78. Id. at 194.5.
79. Id. at 192.2(a). In light of this change, Rules 196.2(a), 196.7(c)(1), 197.2(a), and
198.2(a) were all amended to delete the provisions giving a defendant fifty days to respond
to discovery requests that the plaintiff served prior to the due date for the defendant’s
answer. See id. at 196.2(a), 196.7(c)(1), 197.2(a), 198.2(a).
80. Id. at 194.4(a)–(b). These requirements do not apply to certain actions under the
Family Code, although a court may order the parties in such actions to make these disclo-
sures. Id. at 194.4(c).
81. Id. at 195.5(a)(4). These three new requirements are based on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). Id. at 195.5 cmt. to 2021 amendment.
82. Id. at 195.2.
83. Id. at 195.5(c)–(d).
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Beyond the foregoing rule amendments, the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed other discovery issues in the Survey period. The intersection of
the statutory requirements for the delivery of an expert report and the
deadline in the scheduling order for the service of expert reports was at
issue in Shinogle v. Whitlock.84 The plaintiff customer presented his rifle
to the defendant safety officer for a pre-entrance safety inspection at the
defendant gun range, and while the gun was in the safety officer’s posses-
sion, the gun discharged, resulting in injuries to the customer.85 The trial
court entered an agreed Level 3 scheduling order that established a dead-
line for the designation of affirmative relief experts.86 Over ninety days
after the filing of suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the action based
on the customer’s failure to comply with § 128.053 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, which requires a plaintiff suing a gun range
to serve an expert report on each party within ninety days of the filing of
suit unless that deadline is “extended by written agreement of the af-
fected parties.”87 The trial court agreed with the customer that the agreed
scheduling order constituted the requisite “written agreement” but also
granted the defendants’ request for a permissive interlocutory appeal.88
The Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals accepted the appeal and re-
versed, finding that the agreed scheduling order, which did not specifi-
cally reference § 128.053, did not serve to extend the statutory deadline.89
The customer sought review from the Texas Supreme Court, which af-
firmed the appellate court’s ruling on this issue.90 Although it had not
previously addressed the contours of § 128.053, the supreme court noted
that it had addressed comparable expert-report requirements in § 74.351
and § 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and each
time it found that the written agreement had to specifically reference and
agree to extend the applicable statutory deadline.91 The agreed schedul-
ing order at issue neither referenced § 128.053 nor provided for an exten-
sion of the ninety-day deadline, so the supreme court affirmed the
dismissal of the customer’s claims against the range.92
84. 596 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 128.053).
88. Id. at 775 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d)).
89. Alpine Indus., Inc. v. Whitlock, 554 S.W.3d 174, 187 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
pet. granted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 596 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. 2020). The court of
appeals thus dismissed all of the customer’s claims against the range but allowed the claims
against the safety officer to proceed based on its determination that Section 128.053(b)(2)
did not apply to a range’s employees. Id. at 187–88.
90. Shinogle, 596 S.W.3d at 775.
91. See id. at 776 (citing Crosstex Energy Servs., LP v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384,
395 (Tex. 2014); Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc., v. McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d 249, 249 (Tex.
2010)).
92. Id. The supreme court then found that the safety officer was, as an implicated
defendant in the customer’s action against the range, entitled to dismissal due to the cus-
tomer’s failure to serve him with an expert report within ninety days of the filing of suit. Id.
at 777–78.
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In In re Turner, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the availability of
discovery from a nonparty medical provider who had not yet been served
with an expert report.93 The plaintiff filed suit on her child’s behalf
against the hospital where the child was born, and the hospital did not
challenge the sufficiency of the expert report she submitted.94 Discovery
proceeded and included the depositions of some of the nurse-employees
who were present at the delivery.95 The plaintiff also sought to depose
her treating physician, who was not an employee of the hospital, but he
refused to be deposed unless she agreed not to sue him.96 The trial court
denied the doctor’s motion to quash and ordered him to produce the bulk
of the documents the plaintiff sought,97 but the Fifth Dallas Court of Ap-
peals conditionally granted mandamus relief prohibiting his deposition
until he had been served with an expert report.98
The plaintiff sought mandamus relief from the supreme court, which
ruled that the deposition of the doctor could proceed.99 As part of its
analysis, the supreme court addressed in some detail its In re Jorden deci-
sion, in which it held that the discovery stay in the Medical Liability Act
applied to pre-suit depositions sought under Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 202.100 The supreme court found that even though the nonparty ex-
ception in § 74.351(s)(3) did not apply when discovery was sought from a
potential healthcare liability provider defendant who had not received an
expert report,101 the plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to depose the
treating physician because she had a pending claim against the hospital
provider, which she had served with an appropriate expert report.102 As
such, there was no need to address the exceptions in § 74.351(s) because
discovery “in” the plaintiff’s claim against the hospital was not stayed.103
The supreme court noted that the deposition of the treating physician
would likely reveal relevant information regarding the plaintiff’s claim
against the hospital, but it prohibited her counsel from engaging in a
“fishing expedition” by seeking information that did not focus on what
93. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d 121, 122 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 123. At the same time, the hospital opposed the plaintiff’s motion to extend
the joinder deadline on the ground that the depositions of nonparty providers who had not
yet been served with an expert report constituted pre-suit depositions that are prohibited
under the Texas Medical Liability Act. Id. at 122–23; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.351(s) (providing that, pending service of the required expert report, “all discov-
ery in a health care liability claim is stayed,” except for “written discovery as defined in
Rule 192.7,” “depositions on written questions under Rule 200,” and “discovery from non-
parties under Rule 205”).
97. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d at 123–24.
98. In re Sandate, 544 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding), mand.
granted sub nom.
99. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d at 127.
100. Id. at 125–26 (citing In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2008)).
101. Because the plaintiff’s treating physician was “directly threatened” by a potential
healthcare liability suit, discovery was stayed on any claim against him without an expert
report under the general rule and he was not a nonparty falling within the exception. Id.
102. Id. at 126.
103. Id.
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the hospital’s employees did and why they did it.104
VI. DISMISSAL
In Bethel v. Quilling, the Texas Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether an affirmative defense may serve as the basis for a motion to
dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91(a).105 The attorney de-
fendants in that case had represented the defendant in a wrongful death
case and were later sued by the plaintiff, who alleged they had intention-
ally destroyed key evidence in the original case.106 The lawyers moved to
dismiss under Rule 91(a), arguing they were entitled to attorney immu-
nity.107 The trial court granted the motion and the Fifth Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed.108 The plaintiff argued this was error because, in ruling
on a Rule 91(a) motion, a trial court is limited to the allegations of the
plaintiff’s petition and may not, therefore, consider the defendant’s
pleading of an affirmative defense.109
The supreme court disagreed.110 Although Rule 91(a) states the mo-
tion must be decided “based solely on the pleading of the cause of ac-
tion,”111 the supreme court recognized that does not mean, as the
plaintiff argued, that a trial court is prohibited “from considering any-
thing other than the plaintiff’s pleading.”112 For example, the trial court
may of course consider the motion itself, as well as the response and the
arguments of counsel at any hearing on the motion.113 The rule could not,
therefore, be read as literally as the plaintiff urged. Instead, the supreme
court concluded that “Rule 91(a) limits the scope of a court’s factual, but
not legal, inquiry.”114 The trial court must take the plaintiff’s factual alle-
gations as true, but is not prohibited from considering any legal argu-
ments the defendant may advance to demonstrate the plaintiff cannot
recover based upon those allegations.115 Thus, a Rule 91(a) motion may
be granted based on an affirmative defense if that defense is conclusively
established by the facts as alleged in the plaintiff’s petition.116 Taking the
plaintiff’s allegations in Bethel as true, the supreme court held that the
trial court could properly determine that attorney immunity barred the
104. Id. at 126–27. The supreme court left it to the trial court to decide, based on the
supreme court’s guidance, disagreements over the questions posed at the deposition and
the scope of the treating physician’s document production. Id. at 127.
105. Bethel v. Quilling, 595 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Tex. 2020).
106. Id. at 653–54.




111. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91(a).




116. Id. at 656.
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suit.117
In re Panchakarla raised the question of whether a trial court can va-
cate a prior order granting a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens
Participation Act (TCPA).118 The TCPA establishes a deadline of thirty
days from the hearing date for a trial court to rule on a motion to dismiss,
after which it will be considered to have been denied by operation of
law.119 In this case, the trial court first granted the TCPA motion and
then vacated the dismissal order during the period it retained plenary
power but did so more than thirty days after the hearing on the mo-
tion.120 The Texas Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that
the trial judge was prohibited from entering this latter order, noting that
nothing in the text of the TCPA restrained the authority of trial courts “to
reconsider either a timely issued ruling granting a TCPA motion to dis-
miss or a timely order denying such a motion when no interlocutory ap-
peal is pending.”121 Thus, the supreme court would not “judicially
amend” the statute to add language not contained therein.122
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Fleming v. Wilson, the Texas Supreme Court held a trial court did
not abuse its discretion in considering uncertified court records as compe-
tent evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion.123 The documents
at issue were the uncertified verdict and final judgment from a test trial of
six of the 4,000 client-plaintiffs’ claims against their former attorney and
law firm for alleged overcharges in the “fen-phen” products liability liti-
gation.124 After the client-plaintiffs lost the test trial, the attorneys moved
for traditional summary judgment on the remaining client-plaintiffs’
claims on issue preclusion, release, and waiver grounds, attaching as evi-
dence copies of the test-trial verdict and judgment. The attorneys did not
submit an affidavit or otherwise “aver that the copies were ‘true and cor-
rect,’” but the documents bore an “Unofficial Copy” watermark and “the
clerk’s typical file stamp.”125 The trial court judge, who had also presided
over the test trial, overruled the client-plaintiffs’ objections to the docu-
ments and granted the attorneys’ summary judgment.126 The Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals reversed, holding the uncertified test-trial
117. Id.; cf. S. Cal. Sunbelt Devs., Inc. v. Grammer, No. 03-19-00192-CV, 2019 WL
7342249, at *16 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (plaintiffs’
amended petition did not establish affirmative defenses of statute of limitations and release
for purposes of Rule 91(a) motion).
118. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
119. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.005(a), 27.008(a).
120. In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 538–39.
121. Id. at 540.
122. Id. at 540–41.
123. Fleming v. Wilson, 610 S.W.3d 18, 22 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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records were not competent summary judgment evidence.127 The su-
preme court disagreed and held the trial court properly could have found
the test-trial records authenticated under Texas Rules of Evidence
901(b)(4)128 or 901(b)(7),129 thereby making them competent summary
judgment evidence under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(a)(c).130 The
supreme court emphasized that authentication under Rule 901 is not
“open-and-shut,” and trial courts should “evaluate the evidence that sup-
ports the item’s authenticity—whether found within the item itself or pro-
vided by an extrinsic source,” to evaluate whether the item is what the
proponent claims.131
In B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court
addressed whether a summary judgment order recital that the trial court
had considered “the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel” was
sufficient to overcome the presumption that a late-filed response and evi-
dence was not considered.132 In this employee’s sexual assault case
against her employer, the employer moved for traditional and no-evi-
dence summary judgment, which the trial court granted in a summary
judgment order containing the foregoing recital. On appeal, the issue
presented was whether the trial court had considered the employee’s un-
timely response and evidence in granting the employer’s motion.133 The
supreme court began with Rule 166(a)(c)134 and explained if the record
does not indicate the trial court granted leave for the late filing, the pre-
sumption is the untimely response or evidence was not considered.135 The
supreme court counseled that courts “should examine whether the record
‘affirmatively indicates’ the late-filed response was ‘accepted or consid-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 20–21. According to the supreme court, subsection (b)(4) does not require
extrinsic evidence to authenticate a document; instead, a proponent may rely on “the ‘ap-
pearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the
item, taken together with all the circumstances’ may ‘satisf[y] the [authentication] require-
ment.” Id. at 20 (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4)). With respect to the test-trial records,
the supreme court had no trouble concluding the trial judge was well within his discretion
to find the documents authentic considering that he “had himself received and signed
[them in the test trial] case.” Id.
129. Id. The supreme court concluded that the watermark and file stamp on the test-
trial records were enough to authenticate the documents under subsection (b)(7), which
provides “public documents may be authenticated by evidence that they were ‘recorded or
filed in a public office as authorized by law’ or are ‘from the office where items of this kind
are kept.’” Id. (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(7)).
130. Id. at 21. The supreme court reasoned the attorneys submitted the test-trial
records as copies of public records that must only be “authenticated or certified.” Id. at 22
(citing and quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(a)(c)). Because the trial court found the records
authentic, Rule 166(a)(c) “permitted the court to consider the documents in deciding the
summary judgment motion.” Id.
131. Id.
132. B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 257 (Tex. 2020) (per
curiam).
133. Id. at 259.
134. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166(a)(c) provides “[e]xcept on leave of court, the adverse party,
not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits
or other written response.”
135. Steak N Shake, 598 S.W.3d at 259.
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ered,’”136 which indication may be “a separate order, a recital in the sum-
mary judgment, or an oral ruling contained in the reporter’s record.”137
Considering the recital at issue, the supreme court held the trial court’s
unqualified, general statement it considered the “evidence and arguments
of counsel” constituted an “affirmative indication” that the employee’s
response and evidence was considered.138 This recital was enough to
overcome the presumption otherwise, especially when, as here, the em-
ployer had objected to the timeliness of the employee’s evidence but
“neither sought nor obtained a ruling on that objection before or after”
the summary judgment order.139
Finally, in Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, the Texas Supreme Court
disagreed with numerous courts of appeals and held that a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment may be used to raise immunity challenges
to subject matter jurisdiction.140 In doing so, the supreme court reasoned
that it had long held jurisdictional challenges based on immunity could be
made by a traditional summary judgment motion under Rule
166(a)(c).141 The supreme court could “see no reason” to foreclose the
same challenges “via no-evidence motions” under Rule 166(a)(i).142
While the “two vehicles place different initial burdens on the movant,”
the supreme court rejected lower courts’ characterization of the nonmov-
ant’s burden under the no-evidence procedure.143 Rather than requiring
the nonmovant to “marshal” its evidence or “prove up its case” to defeat
the motion, the nonmovant needed only “to produce enough evidence . . .
to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged element.”144
The supreme court emphasized that no-evidence motions could only be
brought “[a]fter adequate time for discovery.”145 That timing difference,
according to the supreme court, provided nonmovants responding to a
no-evidence motion “an important degree of protection.”146 The supreme
court concluded that the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals therefore
“erred in refusing to review the trial court’s denial” of a no-evidence mo-
tion “challenging jurisdiction on the basis of governmental immunity.”147
VIII. JURY CHARGE
The need for unanimity in a jury verdict in a civil-commitment pro-
136. Id. at 260 (quoting Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120, 133 (Tex. App—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).
137. Id. at 259–60 (quoting Alphaville Ventures, Inc. v. First Bank, 429 S.W.3d 150, 154
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).
138. Id. at 261.
139. Id. at 262.
140. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019).
141. Id. (citing State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. 2009)).
142. Id. at 551.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 551–52.
145. Id. at 552.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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ceeding was the subject of In re Commitment of Jones.148 The State filed
suit to designate the defendant as a sexually violent predator under Chap-
ter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, which requires a unanimous
jury verdict for such a designation.149 The code also provides, however,
that civil-commitment trials under Chapter 841 are generally governed by
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which permit verdicts based on the
agreement of ten of the twelve jurors,150 with the code controlling in the
event of a conflict.151 The defendant requested an instruction that a unan-
imous verdict was required to find him a sexually violent predator but
that only ten of the twelve votes were required to find he was not. The
trial court did not submit that instruction and instead told the jury that
unanimity was required for either answer.152 The jury unanimously found
in the State’s favor,153 but the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding error in the trial court’s refusal to submit the defendant’s
requested instruction.154
The State sought review from the Texas Supreme Court and contended
it would be “unprecedented” to require varying numbers of jurors on
each side of the same issue.155 The supreme court disagreed, noting that
asymmetry existed with respect to an award of exemplary damages, which
requires unanimity for a finding of malice or gross negligence but only
ten jurors to make the opposite finding.156 The supreme court thus found
the trial court erred in not submitting the defendant’s proposed
instruction.157
The supreme court then addressed whether the trial court’s refusal to
include this instruction was harmful under Texas Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 44.1(a), which requires that the complained-of error either “prob-
ably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably
prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of
appeals.”158 Although the supreme court was unclear on which standard
the court of appeals and the parties were invoking, it concluded that the
jury’s unanimous verdict meant that the trial court’s failure to submit the
requested instruction did not affect the verdict.159 The supreme court
thus reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consider-
ation of the defendant’s other appellate complaints.160
148. In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
149. Id. at 910, 912 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(b)).
150. Id. at 911–12 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 292(a)).
151. Id. at 911 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.146(b)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In re Commitment of Jones, 571 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019,
pet. granted), rev’d, 602 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. 2020).
155. In re Commitment of Jones, 602 S.W.3d at 912.
156. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(d)–(e), TEX. R. CIV. P.
226(a)).
157. Id. at 913.
158. Id. (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)).
159. Id. at 913–15.
160. Id. at 915.
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In contrast, the Texas Supreme Court found harmful charge error in
Glenn v. Leal.161 In this healthcare liability case, the defendant-doctor
contended that the “willful and wanton negligence” standard in § 74.153
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applied to the provision
of “emergency medical care . . . in a hospital’s obstetrical unit,” even
though the patient had not been previously treated in the emergency de-
partment.162 The trial court declined to submit the doctor’s requested
jury questions on whether he provided “emergency medical care” and
whether his “willful and wanton negligence” proximately caused the
baby’s injury. Ultimately, the jury found he was negligent and awarded
the plaintiffs $2.7 million.163 The trial court denied the doctor’s motions
for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict,164 and the
First Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.165 The supreme court, how-
ever, reversed and remanded, finding that the lower courts’ interpretation
of § 74.153 was incorrect, and the resulting harmful error in the jury
charge required a new trial.166
IX. JURY PRACTICE
The propriety of the trial court’s Batson167 rulings was the subject of
the majority and dissenting opinions in United Rentals North America,
Inc. v. Evans.168 In Evans, a tractor-trailer truck carrying an oversized
load ran into a bridge, and a beam from the bridge landed on another car
and killed the driver.169 The driver’s mother and son filed suit and all of
the defendants, except the rental company that owned the equipment be-
ing transported, either settled or were dismissed.170 During voir dire, the
trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ Batson challenge to the defendant’s
striking of two black women and rejected the defendant’s challenges to
the plaintiffs’ striking of five panelists, four of whom were white males.171
After the trial court entered judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor based on the
jury’s verdict, the defendant appealed and, among other complaints, chal-
lenged the trial court’s Batson rulings.172
161. 596 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 770.
163. Id. at 771.
164. Id.
165. Glenn v. Leal, 546 S.W.3d 807, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.
granted), rev’d, 596 S.W.3d 769, 770 (Tex. 2020).
166. Glenn, 596 S.W.3d at 772.
167. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (finding that a criminal defendant is
denied equal protection when panelists are excluded solely on the basis that they are of the
same race as the defendant); see also Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991)
(per curiam) (holding “that equal protection is denied when race is a factor in counsel’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror”).
168. See generally 608 S.W.3d 449, 456 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. filed).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 460.
172. Id. at 456.
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According to the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals, after strikes for cause
and by agreement were taken into account, the panelists in the “strike
zone” included twelve men and fourteen women, and consisted of seven
African-Americans, nine Hispanics, one Asian-American, and nine
whites.173 The plaintiffs struck five men, four of whom were white;
whereas, the defendants, who collectively had nine strikes, struck five
black women, one of whom was outside the “strike zone.”174 The plain-
tiffs accepted the explanation for one of the strikes but challenged the
other four, and when the trial court ordered defendants to turn over their
jury notes, they challenged the plaintiffs’ strikes as motivated by race and
gender discrimination.175 The trial court made copies of both sides’ jury
notes but did not consider them; instead, it heard the parties’ evidence
and granted only two of the plaintiffs’ challenges (to Juror Number 14,
who joined the verdict, and to Juror Number 9, who did not).176
The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in
rejecting the explanation for the defense’s striking of Juror Number 9,
which was based on her body language and other nonverbal conduct but
was not supported by her on-the-record questioning.177 The court of ap-
peals also found that any error regarding the inclusion of Juror Number 9
was harmless under Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1 because she did
not join the verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor.178 Then, the court of appeals
rejected the defendant’s challenges, finding that a comparative analysis
established that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the
explanations offered by the plaintiffs for each of their strikes.179
As part of its analysis, the court of appeals found that plaintiffs’ coun-
sel’s statement that they “know from our focus groups that the African-
American female is the most favorable juror for this case for whatever
reason” was not evidence of discriminatory animus because the statement
was made in the context of rebutting the defendant’s explanation for one
of its strikes.180 In a lengthy dissent from the appellate court’s denial of
en banc reconsideration, Justice Evans found that this statement indi-
cated that the plaintiffs’ strikes of non-black males were motivated in
large part by a desire to have as many black females on the panel as
possible.181
The trial court’s striking of two potential jurors was at issue in Wheeler
v. San Miguel Electric Cooperative, Inc.,182 which arose out of disputes
regarding the validity of a lease. During voir dire, one juror stated that
her friendship with the plaintiffs would not impact her decision but that
173. Id. at 475.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 475–76.
176. Id. at 476.
177. Id. at 478–79.
178. Id. at 479.
179. See id. at 481–85.
180. Id. at 480.
181. Id. at 485–87 (Evans, J., dissenting).
182. 610 S.W.3d 60, 70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied).
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her business relationship with one of the defendant’s employees would
affect her impartiality, although she would try to be impartial.183 Another
juror stated that she could decide the case based only on the evidence but
admitted that she “got pretty angry and bitter” with, and had a bias
against, the defendant.184 Even though neither side requested it to do so,
the trial court struck both potential jurors, and on appeal, the plaintiffs
contended that they were improperly deprived of the opportunity to re-
habilitate them.185
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed.186
First, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs had waived any com-
plaint by failing to object at the time to the trial court’s striking of the two
jurors.187 Second, the plaintiffs did not cite any authority prohibiting the
trial court from sua sponte dismissing unqualified jurors, and the court of
appeals noted that trial courts are obligated to dismiss them.188 Third,
even though there was some evidence the jurors could be fair, the court
of appeals deferred to the trial court’s determination and did not find an
abuse of discretion in striking them.189
Allegations of improper jury argument were at issue in Witt v. Michelin
North America, Inc.190 This products liability action arose out of a fatal
automobile accident, and during closing argument, counsel for the defen-
dant-tire-manufacturer stated that one of the plaintiffs’ arguments was
“dishonest as the day is long.”191 The plaintiffs did not object to this state-
ment when it was made, but they alleged in their motion for new trial,
which the trial court denied, that it was “improper and incurable.”192 On
appeal, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted the general rule
that a complaint about improper jury argument requires a “timely objec-
tion,” a “request for an instruction” that the jury disregard the challenged
statement, and the securing of a “ruling on the objection.”193 The court of
appeals also noted that these steps are not required if the improper argu-
ment is incurable, which entails a showing, on the record viewed as a
whole, that the statement “was so extreme that a juror of ordinary intelli-
gence could have been persuaded” to agree to a verdict to which he
would not have otherwise agreed.194 After analyzing several cases ad-
dressing whether jury argument was or was not incurable, the court of
appeals found that in the context of a hotly contested two-week trial, the
comment from the defendant’s counsel was “not to be applauded” but
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 71.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. No. 02-18-00390-CV, 2020 WL 5415228, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 10,
2020, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
191. Id. at *7.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009)).
194. Id. (citing Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 883).
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did not cause incurable harm.195
X. JUDGMENTS
Determining when a final judgment has been entered was once again at
issue during the Survey period. In re R.R.K. arose out of a father’s motion
to modify a prior order establishing the possession and support obliga-
tions for a child.196 Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a “mem-
orandum” that contained bullet points setting out certain modifications to
the prior order.197 The memorandum also included “Mother Hubbard”
language that any relief not expressly granted was denied.198 Two days
later, however, the father and mother entered into a Rule 11 agreement
that noted an order was being drafted, and both subsequently submitted
proposed orders to the trial court that incorporated the rulings set out in
the memorandum, as well as other provisions required by the Texas Fam-
ily Code.199 Following a hearing, the trial court then entered a compre-
hensive fifty-one page order.200 When the mother appealed that order,
the Fifth Dallas Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the question of its
jurisdiction and ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial
judge’s memorandum substantially complied with the requirements of a
final judgment, and the mother’s notice of appeal was thus untimely.201
The Texas Supreme Court reversed.202 The supreme court first pointed
out that the memorandum failed to include various provisions that the
Family Code requires in final orders entered in suits affecting a par-
ent–child relationship.203 While those deficiencies were not dispositive as
to finality,204 the supreme court further explained the memorandum was
insufficient under its own finality-of-judgments jurisprudence.205 Specifi-
cally, the memorandum did not contain clear and unequivocal language
demonstrating that it disposed of all claims and parties and was final.206
And while a Mother Hubbard clause included in an order entered after a
conventional trial on the merits may be indicative of finality, if there is
any doubt about that issue, then an appellate court should review the
entire record to determine if, in fact, a final order was intended.207 In this
case, the supreme court concluded the terms of the memorandum belied
any argument that it was intended to be a final judgment because, in ad-
dition to the statutory requirements that were missing, the memorandum
195. See id. at *8.






202. Id. at 544.
203. Id. at 542.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 543.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 541.
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failed to fully address the issues of possession and support of the child.208
Based on the entire record, therefore, the court of appeals erred in dis-
missing the mother’s appeal as untimely.209
The distinction between setting the amount of a supersedeas bond
when a judgment is for something other than money or an interest in
property and calculating the loss or damage recoverable from a superse-
deas bond was at issue in Haedge v. Central Texas Cattlemen’s Ass’n.210
There, a nonprofit corporation comprised of landowners, who enjoyed
grazing rights on government property, cancelled the shares of a group of
its members, who brought suit to challenge their ouster.211 The members
lost in the trial court and, after initially posting a $2,500.00 supersedeas
bond, were required by the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals to in-
crease the bond to $132,400.00, a sum that represented the cost to the
members to secure alternative grazing rights for the anticipated two-year
duration of the appeal.212 The members’ appeal was unsuccessful, and, on
the association’s motion for release of the supersedeas bond, the trial
court held it was entitled to recover only $7,000.00, which was the amount
of dues one member failed to pay while the appeal was pending.213 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that, based upon its prior order estab-
lishing the amount of the supersedeas bond, the association should re-
cover more than $100,000.00.214
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s or-
der, explaining that the manner in which a supersedeas bond is calculated
is different from, and insufficient by itself to prove, the actual loss or
damage sustained by the appellee.215 Specifically, in ordering that the as-
sociation should recover based on the “estimated cost” to the members
“to lease alternative grazing pastures,” the court of appeals calculated the
loss on what the members would have incurred if the judgment had not
been superseded, not what “damage [the association] actually in-
curred.”216 The evidence was undisputed that the association could not
have leased the members’ grazing rights to others if the ouster had taken
immediate effect, so the most it could have expected to gain would have
been the payment of dues from replacement members.217 Thus, the asso-
ciation failed to establish any damages beyond the $7,000.00 awarded by
the trial court based on the failure of one of the members to pay those
dues during the course of the appeal.218
208. Id.
209. Id. at 544.
210. 603 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 825–26.
212. Id. at 826.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 826–27.
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XI. ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION
The Texas Supreme Court addressed important issues regarding the
standards for attorney disqualification in shareholder litigation in In re
Murrin Bros. 1885, Ltd.219 That case involved a dispute between two
“warring ownership factions” that each claimed the right to control the
management of “the iconic Fort Worth establishment[:] Billy Bob’s.”220
One side, the Murrin Group, moved to disqualify the lawyers for the
other side, the Hickman Group, complaining that their representation of
both the Hickman Group individually and the corporate entity itself con-
stituted an impermissible conflict of interest.221 Specifically, the Murrin
Group pointed out that the lawyers were representing the individual
members of the Hickman Group as defendants with respect to the Murrin
Group’s derivative claims on behalf of the corporation, while simultane-
ously representing the corporation at the direction of the Hickman
Group.222 The trial court denied the motion to disqualify, and both the
Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals and the supreme court denied man-
damus relief.223
The Murrin Group argued that in light of their assertion of derivative
claims on behalf of the corporation against the Hickman Group, the law-
yers were in the position of representing both the plaintiff and defendants
in the same case, an “axiomatic conflict of interest.”224 To the supreme
court, however, “[t]he battle lines [were] not so clear.”225 The supreme
court explained that while shareholder derivative actions allow minority
shareholders to sue for injuries to a corporation, the corporation is often
resistant to such claims and commonly named as a defendant itself.226
Merely labeling the corporation as a plaintiff based on the derivative
claim is not controlling because then no lawyer could ever represent the
corporate entity without being subject to the same charge of representing
both sides of the case.227 Rather than party labels, the supreme court rea-
soned “the proper inquiry is to look to whether the substance of the chal-
lenged representation requires the lawyer to take conflicting positions or
to take a position that risks harming one of his clients.”228
The supreme court declined to announce a blanket rule governing dual
representation in all shareholder lawsuits.229 In the case before it, how-
ever, the supreme court had little difficulty concluding the trial court had
not abused its discretion in refusing to disqualify the Hickman Group’s
219. 603 S.W.3d 53, 54 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 56.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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lawyers.230 The opinion explains that both sides claimed to be acting in
the best interest of the corporation, and, at its core, the case was about
who should control its management.231 “That question could be vigor-
ously and fairly litigated by the parties and counsel currently before the
court, and the resolution of it would resolve the nagging question of [the
corporation’s] alignment.”232 Moreover, it was unlikely that a jury would
be confused about the lawyers’ roles or the fact that there were two sepa-
rate ownership groups vying for control of the entity.233
XII. MISCELLANEOUS
The Texas Supreme Court weighed in on other important procedural
issues this Survey period. Once again, the Texas Supreme Court cau-
tioned plaintiffs against waiting until “days before limitations expire to
file suit” to avoid adverse consequences of that delay under Chapter 33 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.234 In this case, the injured
plaintiff sued the owner-lessor of a construction trailer and a contractor
for the trailer-lessee nineteen days before expiration of the statute of lim-
itations.235 The owner-lessor answered, timely responded to disclosure re-
quests served with the original petition, and identified the trailer-lessee as
a potential responsible third party.236 Days later, the plaintiff amended
his petition to add the trailer-lessee as a defendant, and the owner-lessor
then moved to designate the trailer-lessee as a responsible third party.237
No party opposed the trailer-lessee’s designation, and the responsible
third-party motion “sat dormant for nearly two years.”238 In the
meantime, the trial court granted the trailer-lessee summary judgment on
limitations grounds and dismissed the plaintiff’s tort claims with
prejudice.239 Afterwards, the plaintiff and trailer-lessee filed objections to
the owner-lessor’s responsible third-party motion, asserting the trailer-
lessee could not be a responsible third party because the limitations had
expired.240 Later, after all claims against the trailer-lessee were dismissed
and it was no longer a party, the trial court denied the owner-lessor’s
designation motion.241
230. Id. at 61.
231. Id. at 60.
232. Id. Indeed, the supreme court noted that for suits involving closely held entities,
the legislature has actually provided a statutory authorization for the courts to treat the
derivative claim as a direct action by an owner brought for her own benefit. Id. (quoting
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.463(c)).
233. Id.
234. In re Mobile Mini, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding).
235. Id. at 783.
236. Id. Of course, by the time the owner-lessor responded to the disclosure request,
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The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals denied the
owner-lessor mandamus relief, but the supreme court granted its petition,
holding that the trial court was required to grant the responsible third-
party motion because: (1) it was “filed more than sixty days before a trial
setting,” and (2) the trailer-lessee was “timely disclosed” in response to
the plaintiff’s requests for disclosure.242 The supreme court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that the owner-lessor was required to disclose the
trailer-lessor as a potential responsible third party before the statute of
limitations expired under Chapter 33, even though the owner-lessor’s dis-
closure responses were not yet due under the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.243 The supreme court reasoned that it was the plaintiff, not the
owner-lessor, that caused the trailer-lessee not to be disclosed before lim-
itations expired, and this “was the natural consequence of [plaintiff’s] de-
cision to wait to file suit until limitations were nearing terminus.”244
Further, the supreme court found that § 33.004(d) of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code required only that defendants timely disclose
potentially responsible third parties such that plaintiff’s proposed earlier
disclosure rule “is repugnant to the statutory language, unfairly burdens
defendants, and skews the legislatively determined balance of inter-
ests.”245 Finally, the supreme court quickly disposed of the plaintiff’s
other arguments against the trailer-lessee’s designation as a responsible
third party, emphasizing the trailer-lessee (1) was not still a party at the
time the trial court improperly denied the owner-lessor’s motion, and (2)
the trailer-lessee’s substantive defenses to liability were irrelevant under
Chapter 33’s proportionate-responsibility scheme because “‘responsibil-
ity’ is not equated with ‘liability.’”246 The supreme court, therefore,
granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to grant the owner-
lessor’s motion to designate the trailer-lessee as a responsible third
party.247
The Texas Supreme Court held that a finding of bad faith was required
to support sanctions imposed against an attorney (Brewer) under a trial
court’s inherent authority where no “rule, statute, order, or any other
authority proscribed or conscribed” the conduct at issue.248 That conduct
was Brewer’s commissioning of a pretrial survey249 in the county-of-suit
about a month before a scheduled jury trial in a products liability case.250
242. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.002, 33.004(a), 33.004(d)).
243. Id. at 784.
244. Id. at 785.
245. Id. at 786–87.
246. Id. at 787 (quoting Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochuca, 290 S.W.3d 863,
868–69 (Tex. 2009).
247. Id. at 788.
248. Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 716 (Tex. 2020).
249. Id. A copy of the survey itself is attached to the supreme court’s opinion. Id. at
731–38.
250. Id. at 708–709. The product was “yellow-jacketed corrugated stainless steel tubing
(CSST).” Id. at 709. The suit was brought after a residential house with CSST piping caught
fire in a lightning storm resulting in fatal and other significant personal injury and dam-
ages. Afterwards Lubbock issued moratoriums on use of CSST pipe for construction in the
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Brewer “did not inform the [trial] court or other parties about the survey
before, during, or after”251 it was conducted, but upon learning of it days
later, plaintiffs’ counsel “immediately requested a protective order and
sought sanctions against [the defendant manufacturer], Brewer, and
Brewer’s law firm.”252 The “case settled the weekend before trial,” and,
months later, the trial court held seven days of evidentiary hearings on
amended sanctions motions against only Brewer and the firm.253 Over a
year later, the trial court ordered Brewer to complete ten hours of ethics
education and pay “a total of $133,415.27 in attorney[’]s fees and ex-
penses, plus $43,590.00 in contingent fees and expenses.”254 Brewer ap-
pealed, and the Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the
sanctions order, reasoning that “the record supported the trial court’s
‘perce[ption] that Brewer’s “intentional and bad faith conduct” in con-
nection with the telephone survey’ imperiled the court’s core judicial
functions.”255
The supreme court reversed, holding that (1) “bad faith is required to
impose sanctions under the court’s inherent authority,” and (2) there was
insufficient evidence of Brewer’s bad faith in developing or employing
the survey to support the sanctions order.256 After explaining that courts’
“inherent power to sanction necessitates a finding of bad faith,”257 the
supreme court’s discussion focused on delineating the conduct justifying a
bad-faith finding, concluding that: “[i]mproper motive, not perfection, is
the touchstone.”258 Turning to Brewer’s conduct specifically, the supreme
court found “[t]he record bears no direct, or even circumstantial, evi-
dence of bad faith.”259 While noting the “trial court’s concerns about the
survey were reasonable,” the supreme court emphasized that pretrial
surveys, even in the district of trial, “are not necessarily unfair or im-
proper,” and Brewer’s survey reflected “[n]ot perfect, but reasonable”
city and plaintiffs’ counsel participated in local news coverage about the moratoriums and
engaged in community outreach about the “dangers of CSST piping.” Id. at 709–10. Ac-
cording to Brewer, one of the CSST manufacturer’s trial attorneys, these circumstances
“impelled the law firm to commission a pretrial survey to gauge community attitudes to-
ward [manufacturer’s] legal position and defensive theories.” Id. at 710.
251. Id. at 710–11. Brewer apparently also did not inform his client. The CSST manu-
facturer “discharged Brewer days before the trial setting” claiming it “was in the dark
about the survey” thereby creating a conflict of interest with the continued representation.
Id. at 711.
252. Id. at 710.
253. Id. at 711.
254. Id. at 714.
255. Id. at 715 (quoting and citing Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 546 S.W.3d
866, 881, 885–86 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. granted), rev’d, 601 S.W.3d 704, 730 (Tex.
2020) (alteration in original)).
256. Id. at 717.
257. Id. at 718.
258. Id. at 719 (noting that “‘[b]ad faith’ includes ‘conscious doing of a wrong for a
dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose’ Errors in judgment, lack of diligence, un-
reasonableness, negligence, or even gross negligence—without more—do not equate to
bad faith.”) (internal citations omitted).
259. Id. at 723.
46 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 7
efforts at balance and “other markers of good faith.”260 With respect to
the trial court’s complaints about Brewer’s demeanor during “one full
day when [he] was in the hot seat under questioning from lawyers for five
adverse parties,”261 the supreme court held that Brewer’s “attitude or
courtroom behavior,” either standing alone or in combination with the
survey, was not the kind of “bad faith, unprofessional and unethical” con-
duct that would support the sanctions order.262
260. Id. at 724–26. According to the supreme court, those “markers” included: (1) qual-
ified third-party experts; (2) proper relevant universe and randomly drawn representative
sample; (3) adherence to generally accepted standards; and (4) randomized favorable and
unfavorable message-testing questions. Id. at 726–29.
261. Id. at 711.
262. Id. at 730.
